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Surface Mining in Kentucky
BY CAROLYN S. BRATT*
INTRODUCTION
In 1977, Congress enacted the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act (SMCRA or the Act). I The Act, designed to pro-
tect the environment and society from the adverse effects of sur-
face coal mining 2 and to insure uniform minimum nationwide
regulatory standards, 3 established a comprehensive regulatory
scheme for surface mining and reclamation operations of both
federal and non-federal lands4 within the United States.
The Secretary of the Interior, acting through the Office of
Surface Mining and Reclamation within the Department of the
Interior, is charged with administering and implementing the
Act.5 Implementation is divided into two stages.6 During the ini-
tial, or interim phase, 7 all surface mining operations within a
state are subject to federal enforcement of certain federally-pro-
mulgated environmental protection standards, complemented by
continued state regulation.8 Under the second, or permanent
phase, all surface mining operations within a state are subject to
. Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.A. 1965, State University of
New York at Albany; J.D. 1974, Syracuse University. The author gives special recognition
for her research work to Carolyn M. Brown, J.D. 1982, University of Kentucky, and for
invaluable editorial assistance to Ann K. Benfield, J.D. 1983, University of Kentucky.
I Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat.
445 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp. 1980)).
230 U.S.C. § 1202(a) (Supp. 1980). The definition of "surface coal mining oper-
ations" includes not only the surface mining of coal by contour strip, area strip, auger or
mountaintop removal methods, but also the surface effects of underground coal mining
and support facilities. Id. § 1291(28)(A).
3 Id. § 1201(g).
4 The Act establishes separate regulatory programs for "federal lands," id. § 1273,
and "Indian lands." Id. § 1300.
5 Id. § 1211(c).6 Id. § 1251.
7 Id. § 1252.
8 A state may issue permits for surface mining during this phase as long as the per-
mits require compliance with the interim program's performance standards. Id. §
1252(b). States are encouraged to assist in the enforcement by a reimbursement scheme for
those who choose to participate. Thus, states which enforce the interim requirements of
the Act in a manner satisfactory to the Secretary of Interior are reimbursed for the addi-
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either federal or state enforcement of a regulatory program com-
plying with all of the Act's environmental and performance stan-
dards. 9
If a state desires to assume permanent and exclusive regula-
tory authority (primacy) over surface mining under the perma-
nent phase, it must submit a proposed permanent program to the
Secretary of the Interior for approval. To receive approval, the
state proposal must show that the state has enacted laws and reg-
ulations embodying the environmental protection and perfor-
mance standards of the Act. The state proposal also must demon-
strate the state's technical and administrative ability to enforce
the required standards. 0 Because coal is an integral part of Ken-
tucky's economy," it is not surprising that Kentucky sought pri-
macy.' 2 Kentucky's revised proposed permanent program was
tional costs of such enforcement beyond their costs of enforcing the state programs existing
prior to the Act. Id. § 1252(e) (4).
The 1978 Kentucky General Assembly adopted major revisions in the statutes gov-
erning surface mining in Kentucky in order to comply with the federal Act and the federal
interim regulations. Act of Mar. 30, 1978, ch. 330, 1978 Ky. Acts 934. The federal interim
regulations were published on December 13, 1977. 42 Fed. Beg. 62,639 (1977). The Gen-
eral Assembly authorized the Kentucky Department for Natural Resources and Environ-
mental Protection [hereinafter cited as DNREP or Department] to promulgate rules and
regulations for the state's interim program. See KY. REV. STAT. § 350.028(5) (Bobbs-Mer-
rill Interim Supp. 1982) [hereinafter cited as KRS]. (The rulemaking entity is now known
as the National Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet. See note 82 infra.)
These statutory changes and the rules and regulations promulgated by the DNREP, are lo-
cated at 405 Ky. ADMIN. REGS. 3:005E-:190 (1982) [hereinafter cited as KAR], became ef-
fective on May 3, 1978.
9 The issuance of a permanent regulatory program by the Secretary of the Interior is
the first step in implementing the permanent regulatory phase. 30 U.S.C. § 1251(b)
(Supp. 1980). The permanent program must incorporate all of the Act's performance stan-
dards.
10 Id. § 1253(b)(4). A timetable is established for submission and approval or disap-
proval of the state's proposal. Id. § 1253(b)-(c). If a state fails to submit a proposal or the
proposal is disapproved, the Secretary of the Interior will be deemed the regulatory
authority administering the Act in that state. Id. § 1254(a). Ultimately, all surface mining
must be repermitted in accordance with the state or federally administered permanent
regulatory program. Id. § 1256(a).
11 For the definition of "surface coal mining operations," a definition which is ob-
viously important to Kentucky, see note 2 supra.
12 In order to achieve primacy, the 1980 Kentucky General Assembly made addi-
tional statutory changes in the state's surface mining laws, Act of Mar. 21, 1980, ch. 62,
1980 Ky. Acts 97 (codified at KRS §§ 350.010-.990 (Cum. Supp. 1980)), most of which
became effective upon the Secretary of the Interior's approval of Kentucky's primacy pro-
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approved by the Secretary of the Interior on May 18, 1982.13
I. RECENT UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
The enactment of the SMCRA and the promulgation of fed-
eral interim and permanent regulations has spawned numerous
legal challenges 14 and proposed legislative amendments to the
Act.15 These legal and legislative actions, coupled with a new ad-
ministration in Washington, have caused significant revisions in
the federally-promulgated regulations. 16
Examination of all of the nationwide legal challenges to the
Act and all of the changes in federal regulations promulgated un-
posal. Act of Mar. 21, 1980, ch. 62, § 39, 1980 Ky. Acts 125. For a discussion of state legis-
lative actions regarding the interim program, see note 8 supra.
13 Kentucky submitted its first proposed permanent program to the Secretary of the
Interior on February 29, 1980. Originally, the proposed state programs were to be sub-
mitted by February 3, 1979. The Secretary of the Interior extended the deadline to August
3, 1979. 44 Fed. Reg. 5,324 (1979). The deadline was further extended to March 3, 1980,
by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. In re Permanent Surface
Mining Regulation Litigation, No. 79-1144 (D.D.C. July 25, 1979 and August 21, 1979);
44 Fed. Reg. 60,969 (1979).
Kentucky's submission included the relevant Kentucky statutes, administrative
regulations and a narrative description of the DNREP plan to implement the proposed
program. For the required content of state proposals, see 30 U.S.C. § 1253 (Supp. 1980).
On October 22, 1980, the Secretary of the Interior approved the plan in part and
disapproved it in part. 45 Fed. Reg. 69,940-70 (1980). Under the Act, Kentucky had 60
days to submit a revised plan. See 30 U.S.C. § 1253(c) (Supp. 1980). However, the Martin
County Circuit Court enjoined the Commonwealth from resubmitting its permanent pro-
gram proposal. Morris & Marshall, Inc. v. Commonwealth, No. 80-C1-238 (Martin
County, Ky. Cir. Ct. Oct. 31, 1980). The restraining order delayed implementation of
either a state or federal permanent program in Kentucky. The federal and state interim
program remained in effect until the restraining order dissolved on October 31, 1981. See
30 U.S.C. § 1253(d) (Supp. 1980). Kentucky resubmitted a permanent program proposal
on December 30, 1981, which was approved by the Secretary of the Interior and imple-
mented effective May 18, 1982.47 Fed. Reg. 21,404 (1982).
14 See, e.g., Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min-
ing & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981). In re Permanent Surface Mining Regula-
tion Litig., 617 F.2d 807 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Andrus v. P-Burg Coal Co., 495 F. Supp. 82
(S.D. Ind. 1980), aff'd, 644 F.2d 1231 (7th Cir. 1981); Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. An-
drus, 494 F. Supp. 679 (E.D. Tenn. 1980), appeal pending, No. 80-1448 (6th Cir.); In re
Surface Mining Regulatons, 456 F. Supp. 1301 (D.D.C. 1978), modified, 627 F.2d 1346
(D.C. Cir. 1980); Meadowlark Farms, Inc. v. Indiana Dep't of Natural Resources, No.
C80-1952 (Marion, Ind. Cir. Ct. 1980).
15 See, e.g., S. 572, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 127 CONG. REC. 1606 (1981).
16 See, e.g., 46 Fed. Reg. 53,376; 52,287; 50,018; 42,082; 41,702; and 37,716
(1981).
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der the Act is not within the scope of this Article. However, two
recent Supreme Court decisions, Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min-
ing and Reclamation Association, Inc.17 and Hodel v. Indiana,8
merit attention because they involved facial, pre-enforcement
challenges to the Act. The Supreme Court not only sustained the
Act's constitutionality in the face of these attacks, but also re-
solved issues about which the Kentucky legislature expressed res-
eriations. 19
The plaintiffs in Virginia Surface Mining contended that the
Act violated the commerce clause of the United States Constitu-
tion because Congress intended to regulate the use of private
land within the states, and private land is not subject to regula-
tion under the commerce clause. 20 The Supreme Court, affirming
the Virginia District Court on this point,21 found that the Act
17 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
18 452 U.S. 314 (1981).
19 These reservations were expressed in the following legislative preamble:
WHEREAS, many requirements imposed on the Commonwealth by
the United States department of interior [sic], office of surface mining,
which must be met before the state can obtain primacy are highly objection-
able on constitutional and policy grounds and the state reserves its right to
oppose the objectionable requirements in the future; and
WHEREAS, many of the objectionable provisions are the subject of
pending litigation which the Commonwealth may elect to join and other ob-
jectionable requirements may be challenged in the courts in the future and
the state may elect to join or initiate litigation challenging these objection-
able requirements; and
WHEREAS, the Commonwealth of Kentucky objects particularly to
the mandatory and inflexible requirement that all surface mined land must
be returned to its approximate original contour with all highwalls complete-
ly covered in all circumstances, the requirement that the state's police
powers must be employed to declare lands unsuitable for mining by petition
process, the requirement that persons must prepay civil assessments before
being allowed to challenge them and the requirements that summary cessa-
tion orders must be issued for bare failure to abate a violation not involving
any danger to the health or safety of the public or environment, and if not
coerced by threatened denial of primacy by the federal office of surface min-
ing, the state would choose to address these matters by measures of its own
devising ....
H.B. 566, Preamble ch. 62, 1980 Ky. Acts 97.
20 The commerce clause gives Congress the power "[tlo regulate Commerce with for-
eign Nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes." U.S. CONST. art.
1,§8, cl. 3.
21 The federal district court rejected the commerce clause challenge, as well as the
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regulated the interstate commerce effects of surface mining. 2 It
was intended to preserve the productive capacity of mined lands
and to protect the public from health and safety hazards that
may result from surface mining.2s The Court held that these ob-
jectives, coupled with a congressional determination that uni-
form minimum nationwide standards were needed,2 provided a
rational basis for concluding that surface mining has substantial
effects on interstate commerce, and further, that the means se-
lected by Congress to regulate surface mining were reasonable
and appropriate to the achievement of these goals, 
5
The Supreme Court, reversing the lower court ruling, held
that the performance standard for "steep slope" mining did not
violate the constitutional limitation on the commerce clause im-
posed by the tenth amendment. The Act only regulates the activ-
ities of private mine operations and does not regulate the activ-
ities of "States as States."'' The Court rejected the Virginia dis-
plaintiffs' equal protection and substantive due process challenges, while sustaining the
tenth amendment, just compensation and procedural due process attacks. Hodel v. Vir-
ginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 483 F. Supp. 425 (W.D. Va. 1980), affd in
part, rev'd in part, 452 U.S. at 264. The plaintiffs cross-appealed from the rejection of the
commerce clause challenge. 452 U.S. at 274.
22 452 U.S. at 280.
2 Id. at 277-80.
24 Id. at 281-82.
25 Id. at 283. One of Congress' articulated justifications for exercising its commerce
clause power was that:
[Miany surface mining operations result in disturbances of surface areas that
burden and adversely affect commerce and the public welfare by destroying
or diminishing the utility of land for commercial, industrial, residential, rec-
reational, agricultural, and forestry purposes, by causing erosion and land-
slides, by contributing to floods, by polluting the water, by destroying fish
and wildlife habitats, by impairing natural beauty, by damaging the prop-
erty of citizens, by creating hazards dangerous to life and property by de-
grading the quality of life in local communities, and by counteracting gov-
ernmental programs and efforts to conserve soil, water, and other natural
resources ....
30 U.S.C. § 1201(c) (Supp. 1980). Congress also justified the Act by finding that "surface
mining and reclamation standards are essential in order to insure that competition in in-
terstate commerce among sellers of coal produced in different States will not be used to
undermine the ability of the several States to improve and maintain adequate standards on
coal mining operations within their borders." Id. § 1201(g).
2 452 U.S. at 293. To sustain a claim that a congressional exercise of the commerce
power violates the tenth amendment, there must be a showing that the challenged statute
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trict court's finding that the "steep slope" mining provisions in-
terfered with Virginia's ability to make "essential decisions"'zr
and to conduct "traditional governmental functions"2 associated
with land use planning.
The district court also had held that the "steep slope" 9 min-
ing performance standards violated the just compensation clause
of the fifth amendment because of the Act's requirement that an
operator perform the "economically and physically impossible ''m0
task of restoring mined land to approximate original contour3
and diminished the value of such restored land "to practically
nothing."32 Furthermore, according to the district court, the
Act's general prohibition against mining in certain locations
constituted an unconstitutional taking.34
The Supreme Court's reversal on the taking issue was predi-
cated on the fact that this case involved a facial challenge to these
provisions with no concrete controversy concerning either the ap-
plication of the Act to a particular mining operation or the Act's
regulates the "States as States," addresses matters that are indisputably "attributes of state
sovereignty," and causes a direct impairment of the state's ability to "structure integral op-
erations in areas of traditional functions." National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833,845-54 (1976).
27 483 F. Supp. at 432.2 8 Id.
29 The challenged "steep slope" provisions require operators to reclaim mined areas
by covering the highwall created by the mining operations and returning the site to ap-
proximate original contour, to refrain from dumping spoil material on the downslope be-
low the mining cut or bench and to refrain from disturbing the land above the highwall
unless permitted by the regulatory authority. 30 U.S.C. § 1265(d) (Supp. 1980).
30 483 F. Supp. at 437.
31 Approximate original contour is defined as follows:
that surface configuration achieved by backfilling and grading of the mined
area so that the reclaimed area, including any terracing or access roads,
closely resembles the general surface configuration of the land prior to min-
ing and blends into and complements the drainage pattern of the surround-
ing terrain, with all highwalls and spoil piles eliminated.
30 U.S.C. § 1291(2) (Supp. 1980).
32 483 F. Supp. at 437.
33 The Act prohibits surface mining operations in national parks and forests or where
they will adversely affect publicly owned parks or places that are included in the National
Register of Historic Sites. 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e)(1)-(3) (Supp. 1980). It also prohibits surface
mining within 100 feet of a cemetery or the right-of-way of a public road and within 300
feet of an occupied dwelling, public building, school, church, community or institutional
building, or public park. Id. § 1272(e)(4)-(5).
U 483 F. Supp. at 437.
1982-83] SURFACE MINING IN KENTUCKY
effect on a specific piece of land. The Court concluded that the
"mere enactment" of the statutes mandating the covering of
highwalls and returning of the land to approximate original con-
tour35 does not constitute a taking.3 Likewise, the categorical
prohibition of surface mining in particular locations37 is not,
upon enactment of the provision, a taking.38 According to the Su-
preme Court, neither section of the Act, on its face, deprives land
owners of their ability to make economically beneficial use of
their land, because non-mining uses of the land are not pro-
hibited by the Act. 39 Further, the Act provides procedures for ob-
taining a variance 0 from the approximate original contour re-
quirement for "steep slope" mining as well as a waiver from the
categorical surface mining prohibitions. 41 As the plaintiffs had
not pursued this administrative solution to their alleged, but in-
choate problem, these issues were not ripe for judicial resolu-
tion.412
5 For references to the requirements, see notes 31 & 33 supra.
36 452 U.S. at 294-95.
31 For a listing of areas where surface mining is prohibited, see note 33 supra.
38 452 U.S. at 296 n.37.
3' Id. at 296-97.
40 "Steep slope" operators can obtain a variance from the approximate original con-
tour requirement only if the mined land is shown to have a post-mining use "deemed to
constitute an equal or better economic or public use" than would otherwise be possible. 30
U.S.C. § 1265(e)(3)(A) (Supp. 1980). There is a separate variance procedure for the
mountaintop removal method of mining. See id. § 1265(c).
The district court concluded that the "steep slope" variance procedures did not
provide a meaningful opportunity for administrative relief because of the statutory re-
quirement that highwa~ls of reclaimed mining cuts be completely covered. 483 F. Supp. at
437. However, the Supreme Court found this conclusion premature because the plaintiffs
did not identify any instance in which the statutory requirement prevented a mine oper-
ator from taking advantage of the variance procedure. 452 U.S. at 297 n.39.
41 The categorical prohibition of surface mining in certain locations contained in 30
U.S.C. § 1272(e) (Supp. 1980) is subject to "valid existing rights." The Secretary of the In-
terior originally interpreted this language to except from these prohibitions only surface
mining operations permitted prior to the effective date of the Act-August 3, 1977. 20
C.F.R. § 761.5(a)(2)(i) (1978). However, the Supreme Court noted that such a narrow in-
terpretation is not compelled by the statutory language or legislative history of the Act. It
also noted that this interpretive regulation was remanded to the Secretary for reconsider-
ation in another case and that the Secretary did not appeal that decision. 452 U.S. at 296
n.37.
42 Id. at 297.
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Although the Court did sustain these provisions of the Act
from a facial challenge, the holding does not settle the issue
raised by the plaintiffs. It is still an unresolved question whether
these provisions when applied to a particular piece of private
property constitute an unconstitutional taking within the mean-
ing of the just compensation clause. 43
Similarly, the Court's decision does not resolve the issue of
whether the Act's requirement that procedures be established for
designating particular lands as unsuitable for some or all mining
constitutes an unconstitutional taking.'" The Court held that the
plaintiffs' challenge to these statutory sections was premature be-
cause the provisions do not become effective until the Act's per-
manent stage is implemented and at the time the plaintiffs com-
menced their lawsuit, the permanent regulatory program was
not in effect. Therefore, the lawsuit could only properly raise
challenges to the interim regulatory program. 45
The plaintiffs in Virginia Surface Mining also challenged cer-
tain enforcement 46 and penalty47 provisions of the Act as violative
of the due process clause of the fifth amendment. The Act directs
the Secretary of the Interior to order total or partial cessation of
surface mining operations whenever the Secretary, on the basis
of a federal inspection, determines that the operation "creates an
imminent danger to the health or safety of the public, or is caus-
ing, or can reasonably be expected to cause significant, imminent
environmental harm to land, air, or water resources."48 If a vi-
olation is not of such a serious threat, a notice of violation first
43 The Supreme Court specifically said that "this holding does not preclude appellees
or other coal mine operators from attempting to show that as applied to particular parcels
of land, the Act and the Secretary's regulations effect a taking." Id. at 297 n.40. See also
id. at 305-07 (Powell, J., concurring).
4 Seegenerally 30 U.S.C. § 1272(a), (c)-(d) (Supp. 1980).
45 452 U.S. at 294 n.36.
46 20 U.S.C. § 1271 (Supp. 1980).
4 7 
Id. § 1268.
48 Id. § 1271(a)(2). If the Secretary determines a violation is not such a serious
threat, a notice of violation must first be issued; if the violation is not abated within a pre-
scribed reasonable period, the Secretary can issue a cessation order. Id. § 1271(a)(3). In
any case, the mine operator may immediately request temporary relief from the cessation
order, which request must be acted upon by the Secretary within five days of receipt. Id. §
1275(c). In addition, all cessation orders are subject to administrative and judicial review.
Id. §§ 1275-76.
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must be issued fixing a reasonable time for abatement of the vi-
olation. 49 Only if the violation is not abated within the prescribed
period can the Secretary issue a total or partial cessation order. If
an operator desires to contest either the existence of a violation or
a cessation order, and a civil penalty has been assessed, the pen-
alty must be prepaid.56
Although due process may require some kind of hearing be-
fore the deprivation of a property right, the Supreme Court held
that the summary administrative action of immediate cessation
orders is justified because it is limited to emergency-situations as
defined by the Act and its implementing regulations.5 The Court
also held that the plaintiffs' challenge to the prepayment of civil
penalties provisions was premature because the record did not
contain any allegations by the plaintiffs or any findings by the
district court that any plaintiff had been affected or harmed by
these statutory provisions. 52 Absent such allegations or findings,
the plaintiffs' challenge did not raise a concrete case or contro-
versy vis-a-vis the operation of these provisions.0
In Hodel v. Indiana,54 a companion case to Virginia Surface
Mining, 5 the Supreme Court reviewed another broad constitu-
tional attack on the SMCRA. 5 The primary focus of Indiana was
a challenge to the validity of several sections of the Act known
49 Id. § 1271(a)(3).
50 Id. § 1268(c). Once the escrow requirement is met, the operator receives a hearing
with the right of administrative and judicial review; if the operator succeeds at the hear-
ing (no violation found or penalty amount reduced), a refund with interest is provided. Id.
51 452 U.S. at 298-303.
52 Id. at 303-04.
5 Id.
5 452 U.S. at 314.
452 U.S. at 264.
5 The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana had declared
21 sections of the Act unconstitutional and thus had permanently enjoined their enforce-
ment. Hodel v. Indiana, 501 F. Supp. 452 (S.D. Ind. 1980), rev'd, 452 U.S. at 314.
Some of the challenged sections and the Supreme Court's disposal of the challenges
were identical to those in Virginia Surface Mining. For example, the Court rejected the
tenth amendment rationale for invalidating the Act. 452 U.S. at 330. It found premature
the taking issue based on the "mere enactment" of the prime farmland provisions, id. at
334-35; and the provisions on procedures for designating particular lands as unsuitable for
surface mining, id. at 335 n.20; the due process issue based on the prepayment of civil
penalties was rejected as well, id. at 335-36. For a discussion of these points, see text ac-
companying notes 35-53 supra.
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collectively as the "prime farmland" provisions. When land qual-
ifies as "prime farmland" and has historically been used as crop-
land, special requirements for surface mining are imposed.57 A
permit to mine on "prime farmland" can be issued only if the
mine operator can demonstrate its "technological capability to
restore such mined area.. . to equivalent or higher levels of
yield as nonmined prime farmland in the surrounding area under
equivalent levels of management," ' as well as its ability to meet
the "soil reconstruction standards" for prime farmland. 59 Upon
completion of mining, the operator's performance bond is re-
leased only if a showing is made that soil productivity "has re-
turned to equivalent levels of yield as nonmined land of the same
soil type in the surrounding area under equivalent management
practices."
The district court had found that the "prime farmland" pro-
visions were beyond Congress' commerce clause power because
they are "directed at facets of surface coal mining which have no
substantial and adverse effect on interstate commerce."61 Relying
on congressional hearings concerning the decline in agricultural
productivity attributable to surface mining,62 the Supreme Court
rejected the district court's decision and found that "Congress
had a rational basis for finding that surface coal mining on prime
farmland affects interstate commerce in agricultural products."13
Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that these provisions ad-
vanced that legitimate goal.64
57 The term "prime farmland" is synonymous with the meaning given "by the Secre-
tary of Agriculture on the basis of such factors as moisture availability, temperature re-
gime, chemical balance, permeability, surface layer composition, susceptibility to flood-
ing, and erosion characteristics, and which historically have been used for intensive agri-
cultural purposes, and as published in the Federal Register." 30 U.S.C. § 1291(20) (Supp.
1980).
'8 Id. § 1260(d)(1).
59 Id. § 1265(b)(7).
60 Id. § 1269(c)(2).
61 501 F. Supp. at 460.
62 452 U.S. at 328-29.
63 Id. at 326. In his concurrence, Justice Rehnquist expressed his concern that lan-
guage in both Virginia Surface Mining and Indiana might indicate that the Court is mov-
ing to an "effect" interstate commerce test rather than the test that the regulated activity
has a "substantial effect" on interstate commerce. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n Inc., 452 U.S. at 307-13 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
64 Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. at 327.
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The district court had similarly invalidated fifteen other pro-
visions of the Act by theorizing that the only adverse effects on
interstate commerce which could justify the Act were air and
water pollution problems caused by surface mining.as It con-
cluded that the fifteen general provisions and the "prime farm-
land" provisions "[were] not directed at the alleviation of water
or air pollution. . and [were] not means reasonably and plain-
ly adapted to the legitimate end of removing any substantial and
adverse effect on interstate commerce."66
The Supreme Court rejected this reasoning as based upon an
unduly limited perception of the Act's goals.6 Congress was con-
cerned not only with preventing water and air pollution prob-
lems caused by surface mining, but also with preserving the pro-
ductive capacity of mined lands as well as protecting the public
from the health and safety hazards which may result from sur-
face mining. In light of these broader purposes, the Court con-
cluded that all the challenged provisions were reasonably calcu-
lated to further these legitimate goals.A8
Unlike the "steep slope" provisions and the approximate orig-
inal contour requirement as applied to "steep slope" mining,
neither the "prime farmland" mining requirements nor the ap-
proximate original contour provisions as applied to "nonsteep
slope" mining provides for any variance from the Act's man-
dates.69 Therefore, the district court had held that the lack of
variance procedures impermissibly discriminates against mining
operations and states in the Midwest because significant coal re-
serves are located under "prime farmland" and few "steep slope"
operations exist. 70 The district court viewed this distinction be-
tween types of mining methods as violative of the equal protec-
tion and substantive due process guarantees of the fifth amend-
ment. 7'
65 501 F. Supp. at 452.
66 Id. at 461.
6 Id.
68 452 U.S. at 327.
6 For reference to the variance provisions, see note 40 supra.
70 The district court believed the distinction between types of mining methods vi-
olated the fifth amendment. See 501 F. Supp. at 469.
71 Id.
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The Supreme Court found this rationale an invalid basis for
holding the Act unconstitutional. The Court characterized the
SMCRA as social and economic legislation which does not em-
ploy suspect classifications or impinge on fundamental rights.
Thus, the legislation is imbued with a presumption of ration-
ality.72 This presumption was not overcome by any showing of
arbitrariness and irrationality; rather, the Act's means are ra-
tionally related to the legitimate governmental purpose of con-
trolling the potential adverse effects of surface mining. Even if
the Act imposes greater burdens on midwestern mine operators,
such a result does not sustain a claim of arbitrariness.73 The dis-
tinction between "steep slope" mining and "prime farmland"
mining can be sustained as rational because of the relative short-
age of level land in "steep slope" areas of the country and the
need to preserve the productivity of "prime farmland." 74
Although the SMCRA withstood the pre-enforcement consti-
tutional challenges presented in Virginia Surface Mining and In-
diana, significant questions remain for future litigation. Both the
"steep slope" and "prime farmland" provisions, as well as the
permanent program's requirement for establishing procedures
designating land as partially or totally unsuitable for mining,
may violate the just compensation clause of the fifth amendment
when applied to particular parcels of land. 75 In addition, when a
state's permanent program becomes effective, the Act's enforce-
ment provisions concerning prepayment of civil penalties before
an operator may contest either the existence of an alleged viola-
tion or the size of the civil penalty assessed is still vulnerable to a
constitutional attack under the due process clause of the fifth
amendment.
II. PRE-PRIMACY KENTUCKY CASES,
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS
AND ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS
Although Kentucky has assumed permanent and exclusive
72 452 U.S. at 331-32.
73 Id. at332.
74 Id. at 332-33.
75 For a discussion of the Court's treatment of this point, see text accompanying
notes 44 & 45 supra.
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authority over surface mining within the Commonwealth, only a
handful of state court decisions and attorney general opinions are
reviewed in this Article. The limited amount of relevant material
is due to the sweeping statutory and regulatory changes which
began with the implementation of the state's interim program for
surface mining on May 3, 1978.76
A. Kentucky Court Decisions
In the 1959 case of Wombles v. Commonwealth,77 Ken-
tucky's highest court resolved whether a particular individual
was an "operator" within the meaning of a statute78 requiring an
operator to obtain a permit in order to engage in the strip mining
of coal in the Commonwealth. The Wombles court found that an
individual who held stock in and was an intermittent employee
of the corporation which performed the mining, but who did not
have any management control of the corporation, was not an
"operator." 79
The problem of determining who is liable for violations of
surface mining laws and regulations is a recurrent one for the
Commonwealth. 80 Obviously, mere employees of a corporation
are not liable for the actions of the corporation. However, use of
the corporate form to insulate individuals from personal liability
is a common practice which interferes with the state's ability to
effectively regulate surface mining effectively. Frequently, by
the time of an enforcement proceeding, the corporate operator is
an insolvent shell lacking the financial and technical resources
either to pay the fine assessed for the violation or to perform the
76 For further discussion of these recent changes, see notes 1-13 supra and accom-
panying text.
77 328 S.W.2d 146 (Ky. 1959).
78 KRS § 350.010(6) (1977) (prior to amendment in 1978) defined "operator" as "any
person, partnership, or corporation engaged in strip mining who removes or intends to re-
move more than one hundred tons of coal from the earth by strip mining within twelve
successive calendar months." That term is now defined as "any person, partnership or cor-
poration engaged in surface coal mining and reclamation operations." KRS § 350.010(8)
(Interim Supp. 1982). The statutory changes does not affect the Wombles decision.
79 328 S.W.2d at 148.
80 For a further discussion of this problem, see text accompanying notes 136-43 infra.
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necessary remedial measures.8 1
Under its police powers, Kentucky established rules and en-
trusted the enforcement of those rules to the Department for Nat-
ural Resources and Environmental Protection (DNREP or the
Department) 82 for the regulation of mining activities in order to
protect the public health and safety from environmental harm
caused by surface mining.83 However, the extent of that power,
particularly the power to deny permit applications, represents an
ongoing source of litigation.
Prior to the 1980 amendments to Kentucky's surface mining
statutes, Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) section 350.060(8) re-
quired each permit application to include a statement from the
holder of the surface estate in the land to be mined manifesting
his or her consent to the proposed mining activity.Y This consent
requirement was enacted because of the widespread use of
"broad form" deeds85 in Kentucky. In Department for Natural
Resources & Envtl. Protection v. No. 8 Ltd. ,86 Kentucky's highest
court found the requirement to be unconstitutional. Its primary
purpose and effect was to change relative legal rights and eco-
nomic bargaining positions of private parties under their con-
tracts. Therefore, the consent requirement did not bear a real
and substantial relationship to protecting the public health and
safety from environmental harm. While eliminating the consent
of the surface owner as a condition of receiving a permit to mine,
the decision did not resolve the problems caused by the use of
"broad form" deeds. 87
81 See, e.g., Leslie Coal & Energy Eng'g, Inc., No. 1766-111-15 (DNREP January
15, 1981).
82 The Kentucky Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection
has been renamed and is now known as the Natural Resources and Environmental Protec-
tion Cabinet. However, as the name change occurred subsequent to the cases and deci-
sions discussed here, references will be to the DNREP or Department.
83 See KRS §§ 350.028 (Interim Supp. 1982) & 350.050 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
' See id. § 350.060(8) (1977).
8 A "broad form" deed is a thorough renunciation of surface rights. The severance
of the mineral rights from the surface estate provision creates two distinct estates in the
land. It does not include any limitations or prohibitions on the methods to be used to ex-
tract the minerals, although it does include a "waiver of damages" provision. In Buchanan
v. Watson, 290 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1956), the Kentucky Court of Appeals concluded that the
surface estate was subservient to the mineral estate.8 528 S.W.2d 684 (Ky. 1975).
87 Kentucky is the only state that has interpreted a "broad form" deed so as to permit
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In Department for Natural Resources v. Stearns Coal,m the
Kentucky Supreme Court again addressed the extent of the au-
thority of DNREP to deny a permit to strip mine. On appeal, the
Department argued that its denial was proper because of its de-
termination that the applicant did not have the legal right to
strip mine the land because the applicant did not have the equiv-
alent of a "broad form" deed. The Court held that nothing in the
language of KRS section 350.085, the statutory section delineat-
ing the criteria for permit denial, permitted the Department to
adjudicate the validity of an applicant's claim of right to strip
mine the property described in the application."' The Stearns
decision is not altered by changes in KRS section 350.085 which
became effective simultaneously with the approval of Kentucky's
permanent program. ®
B. Attorney General Opinions
Although an opinion issued by the Kentucky Attorney Gen-
eral is not legally binding or enforceable, it does provide an
authoritative interpretation of a legal issue. Irrespective of
changes in Kentucky's laws and regulations governing surface
mining, two Attorney General opinions are of continuing vitality
and interest.
The first opinion9 ' again raises the issue of the extent of the
Department's power to deny surface mining permits, as well as
the subsidiary issue of the effect of issuance of a permit on other
Kentucky laws. The Department inquired as to whether it had
the authority to withhold a surface mining permit until it re-
ceived certification that the permit complied with local planning
and zoning ordinances. The Attorney General responded neg-
atively, stating that KRS sections 350.060 and 350.085, which set
out the specific criteria for issuance and denial of permit applica-
tions, contain no requirement that the applicant demonstrate
strip mining. Watson v. Kenlick Coal Co., 498 F.2d 1183, 1190 (6th Cir. 1974). See also
Note, Kentucky's Experience with the Broad Form Deed, 63 Ky. L.J. 107 (1974-75).
8 563 S.W.2d 471 (Ky. 1978).
89 Id. at 473.
10 Act. of Mar. 21, 1980, ch. 62, § 39, 1980 Ky. Acts 125.
91 75 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 556 (August 18, 1975).
1982-83]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 71
compliance with local planning and zoning ordinances, and
nothing in KRS chapter 350 permits the imposition of additional
requirements by DNREP.
92
The Attorney General opinion made clear, however, that the
issuance of a permit to engage in surface mining does not author-
ize the permit holder to violate any law or requirement validly
imposed by another authority.9 Further, a permit to surface
mine is not a license to mine an area where the permit holder
does not have the right to mine under applicable property law.
The second Attorney General Opinion9 addressed the ques-
tion of whether the Department must issue a notice of violation
to a surface mining permitholder before it can issue a notice of
noncompliance" for alleged violations of the laws and regula-
tions governing surface mining. KRS section 350.130(1) provides
for the issuance of only a notice of noncompliance when any rule
or regulation is not followed within the time limits set by the De-
partment or by KRS chapter 350. The Attorney General con-
cluded, however, that the Department has the authority to add
the category of notice of violation as another step in its process of
92 The Supreme Court adopted this strict construction approach in Stearns. 563
S.W.2d at 473.
93 This position had been adopted in earlier opinions. Although 70 Ky. Op. Att'y
Gen. No. 286 (May 7, 1970) states that Kentucky counties lack the authority to prohibit
strip mining as a public nuisance, 66 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 95 (February 17, 1966) de-
clares that, within the limitations imposed by law, Kentucky counties have the authority
to reasonably regulate strip mining by proper planning and zoning regulations. These
opinions were confirmed in 70 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 563 (August 24, 1970).
94 79 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 24 (January 4, 1979).
9' 405 KAR 1:060 § 2(2) (1982) states that: "[ilf the department determines that such
violations have occurred, the department shall by certified mail (return receipt requested)
provide written notice to the operator that such violations have occurred and shall therein
stipulate a reasonable time period for the feasible correction of such violations." Id.
96 405 KAR 1:060(3) (1982) states in pertinent part:
(a) If any of the requirements of KRS Chapter 350 of rules and regulations
adopted pursuant thereto have not been complied with within the time
limits set by the department, or by KRS Chapter 350 or regulations adopted
pursuant thereto, the department shall cause a notice of noncompliance to
be served upon the operator ....
(c) The notice of noncompliance... shall specify in what respects the op-
erator has failed to comply with KRS Chapter 350 or the regulations or or-
ders of the department.
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inspection and enforcement. 7 The relationship between the sta-
tutorily imposed notice of noncompliance and the administra-
tively created notice of violation is that both are enforcement
tools available to the Department after discovery of a violation.
The choice of which of these enforcement tools to utilize upon
the discovery of a violation is solely within the discretion of the
Department.9
C. Administrative Decisions of DNREP
Since May 3, 1978, the effective date of Kentucky's interim
program regulating surface mining, the Secretary of the Depart-
ment for Natural Resources and Environmental Protection (the
Secretary) has been issuing administrative decisions in enforce-
ment actions. Some of these decisions are examined here because
attorneys practicing in this area of the law must be familiar with
the Department and its decisions interpreting Kentucky's surface
mining laws and regulations. However, no administrative ruling
by the Department to date has reached the Kentucky Supreme
Court for final review, and, because the Department does not
publish or compile any index of its administrative decisions, the
identification of relevant decisions may not be complete.
1. Definitions
KRS section 350.085(3) provides, in part, that no strip mine
operation shall be permitted within 300 feet of "any occupied
dwelling unless waived by the owner thereof."" In Lake Coal
Co.,'00 the Secretary ruled that an occupied mobile home is an
occupied dwelling within the meaning of the statute. However,
the Secretary ruled that the date an application for a strip mine
permit is filed is the appropriate time for the determination as to
whether there are any occupied dwellings within 300 feet of the
proposed operation. Thus, the Secretary dismissed the petition
objecting to the issuance of this permit because the occupied mo-
97 79 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 24, at5 (January4, 1979).
9 8 Id.
99 KRS § 350.085(3) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
100 No. 1667-111-15 (DNREP January 16, 1981).
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bile home within the prohibited area had been moved there six
months after the company filed its permit application.
This question was also at issue in Sally Prichard. 10 The peti-
tioner claimed that his motorcycle repair shop was an "occupied
dwelling" within the 300 foot limit because he spent as much as
fourteen hours a day in his repair shop; customers frequented his
shop; he ate meals in his shop; and that all blasting operations on
the proposed permit site would occur during the same hours that
petitioner and his customers were in the shop. The Secretary,
however, ruled that this commercial establishment was not an
"occupied dwelling" and dismissed the petition.
2. Performance Bonds
Before a permit can be issued, the applicant must file a bond
with the Department payable to the Commonwealth with surety
satisfactory to the Department. 02 The bond is to secure perfor-
mance of the rules and regulations governing surface mining. If
the operator's permit is revoked, the performance bond is for-
feited. 03 Although a permit applicant can satisfy the bonding re-
quirement by posting a cash bond, many applicants prefer to use
commercial sureties. Following permit revocations, commercial
sureties have tried to extricate themselves from liability by chal-
lenging certain Department procedures.
When a notice of noncompliance is issued, the Department
may attempt to resolve the violation by entering into an agreed
settlement order with the operator instead of pursuing its statu-
tory remedies in a formal administrative hearing. In Mideastern
Construction & Coal Corp. ,10 the Department had entered into
such a settlement order requiring the operator to complete recla-
mation on the permit. The operator failed to comply with the
order. Thereafter, in a formal administrative hearing, the De-
partment sought permit revocation and bond forfeitures. The
surety argued that it was released from liability because the
10' No. 2375-18 (DNREP June 10, 1981).
102 KRS § 350.060(14) (Interim Supp. 1982).
'03 Id. § 350.130(1).
104 No. 2279-VI-18 (DNREP May 8, 1981).
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settlement order had altered its position by increasing its risk and
liability. The Secretary, however, rejected this argument. A
notice of noncompliance in and of itself does not represent a de-
fault in performance which gives rise to the surety's obligation to
perform under the terms of the performance bond. Rather, the
refusal to correct a noncompliance for failure to complete recla-
mation represents such a default. A settlement order to effectuate
reclamation is an alternative to revoking the permit and forfeit-
ing the performance bond, but, according to the Secretary, this
alternative method does not increase the surety's risk or expose it
to greater liability.
In Mideastern Construction and in Leslie Coal & Energy
Eng'g, Inc., 1s the sureties argued that the failure of the Depart-
ment to notify the surety of noncompliances issued to its prin-
cipal (the operator) relieved the surety of its responsibility on the
performance bond. In both cases this argument was rejected.
The Secretary ruled that although the Department normally does
notify the surety, there is no statutory or regulatory requirement
that the Department must notify the surety of noncompliances is-
sued to the operator. 106
Two other administrative decisions also involved a question
arising from the bonding requirement. In S & C Coal Co. 37 and
J. & D. Coal "Co. ,,08 the sureties argued that the entire perfor-
mance bond could not be forfeited if not all of the permitted and
bonded area was disturbed. The Secretary ruled that even
though the bond is calculated on the basis of the acreage per-
mitted, the permitted acreage is not bonded separately. There-
fore, the entire bond, up to the amount necessary to complete
reclamation on any portion of the permit, may be forfeited.3 9
105 No. 1766-111-15 (DNREP January 15,1981).
10' KRS § 350.130(1) (Interim Supp. 1982) requires only that notices of noncompli-
ance shall be
[h]anded to the person in charge of the operation, and the operator or person
engaged in coal exploration operations or sent by certified mail, return re-
- ceipt requested or by registered mail, addressed to the permanent address
shown on the application for a permit or if no address is shown on the appli-
cation, then to the address known to the cabinet.
Id. (emphasis added).
107 No. 1778-IV-14 (DNREP April 7, 1980).
1'0 No. 1386-02 (DNREP December 13,1979).
109 Since these cases were decided, new regulations have been issued allowing incre-
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Finally, in Hardly Able Coal Co.," ° the Secretary issued an
opinion interpreting the provision for bond forfeiture found in
KRS section 350.130(1)."1 The statute states that upon revoca-
tion of a permit, the bond "shall then be forfeited" to the Depart-
ment. 1 2 Despite the mandatory language, the Secretary ruled
that the legislature intended the "shall" to be merely directive,
meaning that the Department may require the bond to be for-
feited. Further, bond forfeiture is justified only when reclama-
tion must be performed by the Department. In this particular
case, the Secretary did not order any further reclamation on the
permit, thereby exercising his discretion not to require the bond
forfeiture. 113
3. Procedural Matters
A number of administrative decisions have focused upon
issues which are procedural in nature. In Blue River Coal Co.,14
the Secretary accepted the conclusions of a hearing officer who
denied a motion by the Department for a default judgment pur-
suant to Kentucky Civil Rule 55.01. The hearing officer had con-
cluded that the statutorily implemented hearing process is not an
action in the Court of Justice15 which is bound by the civil
mental bonding of the permit acreage. See 405 KAR 1:051 (1982). However, these regula-
tions further provide that
[t]he total amount of bond in effect during an operation as set pursuant to
this regulation shall at all time be sufficient to reclaim the total disturbed
area; provided that the total bond in effect shall be applicable to the total
disturbed area and adequate to cover the cost of reclamation of the total dis-
turbed area.
Id. at 1:051(4). KRS § 350.064 (Interim Supp. 1982) also specifically authorizes incre-
mental bonding.
110 No. 1603-VI-15 (DNREP August 1, 1979).
"' KRS § 350.130(1) (Interim Supp. 1982).
112 Id.
'13 No. 1603-VI-15. Other situations may arise in which the Secretary should exer-
cise discretion not to require the bond forfeiture. For instance, when no mining is per-
formed before the permit is revoked or when no further reclamation work is required, it
would be inequitable to require the bond forfeiture merely because the permit is revoked.
114 No. 1806-IV-05 (DNREP January 9, 1981).
115 KY. CONST. § 109 defines Court of Justice as "a Supreme Court, a Court of Ap-
peals, a trial court of general jurisdiction known as the Circuit Court and a trial court of
limited jurisdiction known as the District Court."
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rules." 6 The ruling is especially important in that Kentucky has
no general Administrative Procedures Act or other statute or reg-
ulation requiring the application of the civil rules to administra-
tive hearings.
As in traditional civil actions, standing issues are presented
from time to time in administrative hearings. In Hardly Able
Coal Co.,"1 the operator, pursuant to KRS section 350.410, had
been ordered to eliminate highwall and to return the land to its
approximate original contour. In this enforcement proceeding,
the operator raised as a defense the landowner's constitutional
claims grounded in the contract clause."8 The landowner, how-
ever, expressly declined to be a party to the administrative pro-
ceeding or to participate other than as a witness. Therefore, the
constitutional issue was held not properly raised under either
Kentucky or federal law because the party who sought to raise it
(the operator) neither had interest in nor was affected by the
challenged statute.n 9 At the time the operator should have begun
restoration of the land and elimination of the highwalls, it could
have reclaimed pursuant either to the statute's requirement or to
its contract with the landowner without any additional trouble
or expense; the statutory requirements would have been met but
for the landowner's objections, and the Secretary did not order
any further reclamation by the operator. Therefore, the operator
had no stake in the resolution of the issue of the constitutionality
of the statute.'2
116 Ky. R. Civ. P. 1(2) states in part: "[1These rules govern procedure and practice in
all actions of a civil nature in the Court of Justice except for special statutory proceedings,
in which the procedural requirements of the statute shall prevail over any inconsistent pro-
cedures set forth in the rules."
117 No. 1603-VI-15 (DNREP August 1, 1979).
11 Hardly Able involved a contract between the landowner and mine operator re-
quiring the operator to leave the mine site flat and not to return it to approximate original
contour nor eliminate the highwalls. The contract was validly entered into prior to the
adoption of KRS § 350.410 (Cum. Supp. 1980), which requires the elimination of high-
walls and the return of the mined land to approximate original contour unless a variance is
granted. The specific ruling by the Secretary not to require elimination of the highwall has
very little precedential value because landowners and operators cannot legally contract to
violate KRS § 350.410 (Cum. Supp. 1980) after May 3, 1978.
119 See United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22 (1959); Holt v. Clements, 97 S.W.2d
397,398 (Ky. 1936).
120 The operator was precluded from raising the landowners constitutional rights
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In Appalachia-Science in the Public Interest,121 an adminis-
trative hearing was convened to resolve a controversy surround-
ing the Department's issuance of an "on-site" construction
exemption from strip mine regulations to B & W Land De-
velopers, Inc. 2 2 All of the petitioners, except the Kentucky Con-
servation Committee (KCC), established standing to challenge
the Department's action under the minimum standing require-
ments of Sierra Club v. Morton. 2 The KCC contended that it
had an absolute right to participate in the administrative pro-
ceeding without any showing of standing because of both the cit-
izens suit provision of the federal Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act'24 and the citizens complaint provisions under
state law. 25
The Secretary ruled that the citizens suit provision of the Act
applies to the state only under the permanent program stage and
not during the interim program stage. The Secretary also ruled
that the federal provision expressly adopts the "injury in fact"
standing requirement for "any person" invoking its procedures. 2
Finally, the Secretary ruled that the citizens suit procedure
creates the right to assert a claim against a state agency only in
federal district court, not in a state agency action.'12
The Secretary also rejected KCC's contention that KRS sec-
tion 350.250 provides automatic standing in state agency pro-
ceedings. The statute states:
under the rationale of NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). The Alabama holding
applies only when the non-party's rights would as a practical matter be impaired and if
the non-party has no effective way to protect his or her rights. In the instant case DNBEP
did not order restoration of the landowner's property in conformity to KRS § 350.410
(Cure. Supp. 1980), and the landowner had already brought suit in Franklin Circuit
Court (which was pending the results of the administrative hearing).
121 No. 1598-07 (DNBEP March 23, 1979).
2 2 DNREP no longer grants "on-site" construction exemptions. DNREP Policy
Memorandum No. 80-0013 (August 29, 1980). Therefore, the resolution of the validity of
the exemption in this case will not be discussed.
123 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
124 30 U.S.C. § 1270 (Supp. 1980).
125 KRS § 350.250 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
126 The Act applies to "any person having an interest which is or may be adversely
affected." 30 U.S.C. § 1270(a) (Supp. 1980).
127 Appalachia-Science in the Public Interest, No. 1598-07.
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Any citizen of this commonwealth having knowledge that any
of the provisions of this chapter or regulations adopted there-
under are wilfully and deliberately not being enforced by any
public officer or employe, whose duty it is to enforce such pro-
visions... may bring such failure to enforce the law to the at-
tention of such public officer or employe . . . . If such public
officer or employe neglects or refuses for any unreasonable
time after demand to enforce such provision, any such citizen
shall have the right to bring an action of mandamus in circuit
court of the county in which the operation which relates to the
alleged lack of enforcement is being conducted. 12s
As the Secretary observed, the statute clearly confers standing on
"any citizen... having knowledge" to institute a mandamus
action against the Secretary in the appropriate circuit court. It
does not, however, confer standing on "any citizen" to partic-
ipate in a specific enforcement action against a regulated party
before the administrative agency. It takes something more than
the intervenor's status as a "citizen" to justify participation in
such an action. The Secretary also ruled that KCC's standing de-
fect was not waivable even in light of the lack of objection by any
of the parties. 2
4. Penalties1 3
KRS section 350.990(1) mandates civil penalties for viola-
tions of KRS chapter 350 and its regulations. 131 Because these
civil penalties are phrased in terms of mandatory minimum and
maximum fines for the initial violation and for each day there-
after that the violation continues, the amount of the civil penalty
can quickly become quite large. 1 2 Thus, it is not surprising that
128 KRS § 350.250 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
1 2 No. 1598-07.
130 Although DNREP collects civil penalties from operators who voluntarily comply
with settlement or departmental orders assessing penalties, the Department has never col-
lected a civil penalty from an operator who has chosen to defy a settlement or depart-
mental order. Leathers, Settling a Noncompliance: What Process Is DueP, Ky. CoAL J.,
May 1981, at 24, col. 3.
13' KRS § 350.990(1) (Interim Supp. 1982).
132 See, e.g., Leslie Coal & Eng'g, Inc., No. 1766-111-15 (DNREP January 15,1981)
(civil penalty of $2,965,300 assessed).
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defendants in administrative enforcement actions seek to min-
imize their penalties through an assortment of arguments.
In J. & D. Coal Co.,'- the operator contended that KRS sec-
tion 350.100134 (which requires an operator to commence rec-
lamation as soon as possible after beginning strip mining and to
complete its reclamation within twelve months of the expiration
of the permit) and KRS section 350.1301, (which directs the De-
partment to issue notices of noncompliance for violations) acted
as a time bar to the enforcement action. According to the oper-
ator, the notice of noncompliance was issued ten months after
one year elapsed followed the expiration of the permit. The oper-
ator argued that these two statutory provisions require the De-
partment to issue noncompliances no later than a short time after
one year has elapsed following the permit expiration. This inter-
pretation was rejected because it would make the combination of
the two statutory provisions a statute of limitations. The Secre-
tary determined that KRS section 350.100 merely gives the oper-
ator some flexibility in completing reclamation; it does not re-
strict the power of the Department to seek enforcement of the
operator's reclamation obligations.
In Blue River Coal Co. ,136 411 days had elapsed from the issu-
ance of the notice of noncompliance for mining without a permit
until the formal administrative hearing. The Secretary accepted
a report of the hearing officer recommending that only the max-
imum penalty for a one day violation be assessed due to the De-
partment's failure to institute enforcement procedures within a
reasonable time. Because of the unreasonable delay, the report
concluded, the Department was estopped from asserting its
claim for the full civil penalty. However, it should be noted that
this "reasonable time" rationale is not necessary to support a de-
cision to impose only the one day maximum penalty. The same
penalty could have been assessed based on the fact that the evi-
dence (testimony of the Department's inspector) established only
that the company conducted unpermitted mining activities on
133 No. 1386-02 (DNREP December 13, 1979).
134 KRS § 350.100 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
13 KRS § 350.130 (Interim Supp. 1982).
1 6 No. 1806-IV-05 (DNREP January 15,1981).
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the date (one day) of the Department's inspection.
Assuming a civil penalty is properly assessed, a subsidiary
question arises as to the party responsible for the payment of the
penalty. In Leslie Coal & Energy Eng'g, Inc.,137 the permit was
issued to a corporate entity. The stockholders as well as the indi-
vidual officers and directors of the corporation were named as re-
spondents. The Secretary accepted the hearing officer's conclu-
sion that the Department lacks authority, in an administrative
hearing convened pursuant to KRS chapter 350, to disregard the
corporate structure of an operator. To achieve that goal, the De-
partment's remedy is to pursue the matter in circuit court as it is
the proper forum for determining whether the corporate veil
should be pierced and the individuals behind the corporate struc-
ture held responsible for the payment of the civil penalty. 1-s
Kentucky's surface mining law not only provides for assess-
ment of civil penalties against an operator who violates its man-
dates, but it also provides a method by which operators can be
permanently barred from obtaining other surface mining per-
mits. KRS section 350.130(3) directed the Department not to is-
sue any "permits to or allow future operations by any operator or
person who has repeatedly been in noncompliance or violation of
this chapter, or who has had permits revoked or operations ter-
minated on more than three (3) occasions."1 The Department
has not established any regulation nor issued any administrative
interpretation defining the phrase, "who has demonstrated a
pattern of willful violation."'14 No objective standards as to the
number or type of violations are specified in the statute as criteria
for making the mandated determination. In Leslie Coal &
Energy Eng'g, Inc. 41 and Titus Frederick,'42 the operators were
137 No. 1766111-15 (DNREP January 15,1981).
138 For the Secretary's determination that individual stockholders can be permanent-
ly barred from mining, see text accompanying notes 139-43 infra.
139 KRS § 350.130(3) (1977). The pertinent part of the statute now reads: "The cab-
inet shall not issue any permits to or allow future operations by any operator or person
who has demonstrated a pattern of willful violations of this chapter .... KRS §
350.130(3) (Interim Supp. 1982).
140 See KRS § 350.130(3) (1977).
141 No. 1766-111-15.
142 No. 1265-01 (DNREP Aug. 7, 1979).
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permanently barred from receiving future permits for nine and
seven major and continuing violations, respectively, which
caused serious environmental damage and which were unrem-
edied at the time of the determination. However, whether fewer
violations or violations less serious in their environmental effect
might similarly result in permanent barring has not been de-
cided. Obviously, the number, severity and length of time of the
violations, coupled with the presence or lack of remedial mea-
sures and the amount of environmental harm, are all factors in
determining whether the operator should be permanently barred
from mining. Thus, a case-by-case analysis based upon the total
circumstances of the particular situation is necessary before the
permanent permit bar penalty can be imposed.
Leslie Coal also raised the issue of whether individual stock-
holders in the corporate permittee could be individually barred
from future mining when the corporate entity is barred. The Sec-
retary, rejecting the conclusion of the hearing officer, held that
an individual stockholder could be barred if that individual
owned more than a ten percent interest in the barred corpora-
tion. 143 Because the Secretary did not issue an opinion delineating
the reasons for her decision to bar the individual stockholders,
one can only speculate as to the source from which the Depart-
ment's alleged authority on this issue is derived. 44
5. Responsibility for Violations and Noncompliances
In Leslie Coal & Energy Eng'g, Inc..145 the permittee, Leslie
Coal Corporation, did not physically remove the coal from the
permitted area because another company under a contract -with
Leslie Coal performed this task. It therefore argued that it was
not legally responsible for the violations on the permitted area
because the statutes and regulations apply only to the "operator"
143 No. 1766-111-15.
144 It would appear that when the Secretary of DNREP rejects all or part of a hear-
ing officer's findings of fact and conclusions of law, there is a requirement that the Secre-
tary must then delineate what findings of fact are the basis for the conclusions of law. See
Simms v. Angel, 513 S.W.2d 176 (Ky. 1974); Pearl v. Marshall, 491 S.W.2d 837 (Ky.
1973).
145 No. 1766-111-15.
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or person "engaged in strip mining," and further argued that be-
cause it did not physically remove the coal it was merely the
"permittee" and not the "operator" within the definition of the
statute. 1
4
The Secretary rejected this argument. When all the statutory
and regulatory provisions are read together, it is apparent that
the term "permittee" is included within the term "operator."
KRS chapter 350 uses the term "permittee" only once' 47 and does
not define it. The legislature phrased its mandates in terms of
"operator" rather than "permittee" because such usage allows
the application of the legislation to those who are "permittees"
by virtue of their receipt of a permit as well as to those who
engage in strip mining activities without first obtaining a permit.
"Operator" is clearly broader in meaning than "permittee' and
thus encompasses within its reach any "permittee."
In both Leslie Coal & Energy Eng'g, Inc.' 48 and R.C. Coal
Co. ,"4 the issue of whether the original permittee has liability
when a "successor operator" caused the violations was raised.
"Successor operator" is a legal term of art which refers to an
operator who succeeds another operator on an uncompleted
operation, has been issued a permit, has posted a bond and has
assumed all liability for the reclamation of the area affected by
the former operator. 10 If an operator meets this statutory defini-
tion, then the Department may release the first operator from all
liability as to the particular operation.
Leslie Coal Corp. argued that the Department forfeited its
right to impose sanctions because the Department knew that
others were mining the Leslie permit and yet took no action. The
146 At the time Leslie Coal was decided, "operator" was statutorily defined as:
any person, partnership or corporation engaged in strip mining who re-
moves or intends to remove more than two hundred fifty (250) tons of coal
from the earth by strip mining within twelve (12) successive calendar
months or who removes overburden for the purpose of determining the loca-
tion, quality or quantity of a natural coal deposit ....
KRS § 350.010(6) (Cum. Supp. 1980). For the current statutory definition of operator, see
note 78 supra.
147 See KRS § 350.135(2) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
14' No. 1766-111-15.
1' No. 2427-111-03 (DNREP March 24, 1981).
150 KRS § 350.135(1) (Cure. Supp. 1980).
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R.C. Coal Co. asserted that its subcontractor had caused the vi-
olations and was thus the responsible party. In both cases, the
Secretary found the relationship between the permittee and the
actual person performing the mining was irrelevant to the per-
mittee's liability; rather, KRS section 350.135 sets forth the con-
ditions under which the Department will look to a "successor
operator" to assume liability for the permit. The burden is on the
original permittee to have its successor apply for a "successor
operator's" permit. The Department does not have a legal duty
to investigate the contractual relationship between the permittee
and those actually mining the permit. In fact, third party agree-
ments are beyond the scope of authority of hearings held under
the statutory authority granted the Department by either KRS
chapter 350 or chapter 224.111 The sole method for transferring
the permittee's responsibility for the permit to another is con-
tained in KRS section 350.135, and that section was not followed
in either case. Therefore, the original permittees were liable to
the Department for any violations on their permitted areas.
Neither of these cases addressed the liability of the original
permittee for violations caused by the acts of a party not asso-
ciated with the permittee in any manner. For instance, if a
"wildcat" miner who is a stranger, and who under cover of dark-
ness mines on the permit of another in violation of the law,
would the permittee be liable to the Department for the viola-
tions? To date, the Secretary has not addressed this particular sit-
uation. However, in L & N Coal Co. ," a similar problem arose.
Seven years after the permittee stopped mining on the permitted
area, a slide developed. Although the permit had long since ex-
pired, the performance bond was never released. The uncontro-
verted evidence established that the slide was not caused by the
original permittee's mining; rather, it was caused by a small deep
mine operated by the landowner for his own use. The Secretary
accepted the report and recommendation of the hearing officer,
and the Department's complaint was dismissed with prejudice.
The performance bond was released because, although the per-
'5' KRS § 224.083 (Cum. Supp. 1980) provides for hearings for violations of the en-
vironmental laws embodied in the chapter.52 No. 1701-IV-14 (DNREP April 17,1980).
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mittee assumes liability for damages caused by its work, it is not
strictly liable for violations in the permit area caused by others.
CONCLUSION
The public has a legitimate interest in protecting the environ-
ment and society from the adverse effects of surface mining. Sim-
ilarly, the development of this country's coal reserves as an alter-
native energy source is a political and economic necessity. How-
ever, any attempt by the federal and state governments to man-
date an appropriate balance between these concerns is circum-
scribed by certain constitutional limitations on governmental ac-
tion as well as certain constitutional guarantees to individuals.
Therefore, it is not surprising that the SMCRA already has been
the focus of constitutional litigation. Moreover, the sweeping,
technical nature of the Act, the interplay of federal and state leg-
islation and case law, as well as the myriad of state and federal
regulations spawned by the Act, guarantee that the regulation of
surface mining will continue to be a fertile source of federal,
state and administrative litigation in the future.
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